Public goods, private interest and altruism by Mozsár, Ferenc
Bajmócy, Z. – Lengyel, I. (eds) 2009: Regional Competitiveness, Innovation and Environment. 
JATEPress, Szeged, pp. 87-96. 
 
Public Goods, Private Interest and Altruism 
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This study shows through an example of a public good-like commodity, that the market might 
possibly provide the commodity even when there is no rivalry in its consumption and the 
exclusion of non-payers is costly. The actions of the market actors motivated by private 
interest both on the demand and supply side may render public (eg. government) decision 
unnecessary, and thus the necessary welfare losses a sociated therewith (like taxation, 
public choice, allocation of resources, particular interests) can be avoided. I will also show, 
that altruistic behaviour – which is, in a way quite distant from the logic of the market – does 
not necessarily enhance efficiency. 
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1. Introduction 
Economic theory and practical evidences show, that private demand for public 
goods, which is, the individuals’ willingness to pay, nd the supply of these goods 
frequently results in socially suboptimal quantity of these goods. Economic theory, 
however, clearly suggests possible solution most of the time as well. This solution is 
typically not a kind of centralised decision mechanism, that appears a plausible 
solution, but there are generally methods that can be activated, devised by the 
entrepreneur on the supply side. It is always advisble to consider these methods, as 
in this case we do not have to calculate with the transaction costs and other 
efficiency losses linked to the public provision of these goods (costs of taxation, 
allocative losses in connection with realisation of partial interests). In this short 
paper I would like to illustrate my above view through an example of an arbitrarily 
chosen public good-like commodity. As a by-product of this simple model it can 
also be shown how, under certain circumstances, it does not matter whether self-
interested market behaviour is accompanied by altruistic behaviour. 
Well-known definitions for a public good mention non-rivalrous consumption 
(Samuelson 1955, Mansfield 1975), non-excludability (Fisher 2000, Pearce 1993), 
extern effects (Buchanan – Stubblebine 1962, Cornes–Sandler 1996), indivisibility 
(Stiglitz 2000) of the good and possibly governmental provision (Rodda 2001) as 
differentiating characteristic.1 I will now take non-rivalry as a sole important 
                                                   
1 On the notion of public goods in detail see Mozsár (2003). 
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characteristic of a public good, which also means that congestion will not happen in 
spite of a growth in the number of consumers. Non-excludability as a frequently 
mentioned attribute of a pure public good will be handled as a second condition, 
which might go together with the first, but it result  in different kinds of problems. It 
can also characterise private goods, and should be handled differently. A third 
dimension of the public good problem is whether the good in question is discrete or 
continuously divisible. In the first case, we only have to make a „yes-no” decision, 
or more of this kind consecutively, in the other case decision have to be made about 
the quantity too. In this paper I will investigate a perfectly discrete good, the 
consumption of which is non-rivalrous, there is no congestion and non-payers can 
only be excluded at prohibitively high cost. 
In this sentence most of the papers that I am aware of would have said that 
non-payers are non-excludable, but the main problem is the high cost of exclusion, 
not the technical impossibility of exclusion. Thus „non-excludability” in reality 
means, that taking on the cost of exclusion leads to a socially not efficient outcome, 
since the costs associated with exclusion would mean a greater burden on society 
than the potential loss associated with solutions allowing free riding (where loss 
results form suboptimal allocation of resources or form supply provided by the 
government) or with the altogether failure of supply. „Too costly” exclusion 
techniques may hinder the market altogether from producing the good. In this case 
the entrepreneur has to discover or invent less costly excluding techniques. But if 
exclusion is currently indeed „too costly”, the possibility of free riding has to be 
considered and one should investigate, whether private solutions could possibly lead 
to efficient outcome under the circumstances. 
2. The case of a single potential buyer 
In the most simple case there exist one and only one consumer whose reservation 
price exceeds the production cost of the good in question. In such cases it is 
possible, that this person alone provides the public good by herself. The only 
condition for this to happen is, that her disutility (envy) resulting from others’ free 
riding should not decrease her net welfare from consuming the public good below 
the production cost of it, and that she should be sur  that without her contribution 
the public good would not be produced at all. In other words, she has to have p rfect 
information over the others’ willingness to pay. The only rational thing to do for her 
is to produce the public good, access to which is now the same as it would be with a 
private good. The positive value others attach to this good now does not play any 
role, since the good is assumed to be discrete and co gestion effects are ruled out. 
This kind of solution is does in fact happen frequently in the reality, 
especially in the case of public goods of smaller value.2 The probability of this kind 
                                                   
2 Someone or other from the block will eventually salt the frozen sidewalk. 
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of solution is higher as the intensity of preferencs in the group become more 
differentiated. Intensity of preferences is often dtermined by the status, for example 
by the wealth of the individual, and the more it is differentiated, the more probable it 
is, that there exist someone in the relevant group whose valuation exceeds the public 
good’s cost of production. It is clear, that the more real estates one has, the higher 
she values a prospective decrease in real estate tax (as a public good), and the more 
she is willing to sacrifice to win the decision makers (legislators) to this case. 
„Small” actors are thus fairly able to exploit the „big” actor or actors, as we shall see 
later (Olson 1971). 
3. More than one potential buyers 
The situation is more difficult if there are more than one actors in the relevant group, 
whose valuation exceeds acquisition costs of the public good, because this opens up 
for them a way to free ride. In this case, it is not totally certain, that the good will be 
acquired at all (Hindriks–Pancs 2001). Let b indicate the utility of the public good to 
any consumer, and C the cost of acquisition. Let us assume, that b > C for every 
member of the group! If a member of the group is sure, that no other member will 
provide the public good, it is rational to her to acquire it herself. Her net utility than 
is b – C. If she succeeds in free riding, however, her net utili y will be b. The course 
of action she will take is dependent on the relation between the certain b – C and the 
expected b when free riding. Precondition for a successful free ide is the existence 
of at least one actor in the group, let us call her altruist – as opposed to the egoist 
free rider – who is willing to finance the public good unconditionally whenever  
b > C holds. Let us suppose, that the relevant group is a random subset of a 
population where the ratio of egoists is e[e ∈ (0,1)]3.The likelihood that in a group 
of n ≥ 2 there is no altruist is than en and thus obviously the likelihood of there being 
at least one altruist is 1 – en. If we look at the situation from the point of view of an 
egoist, than the likelihood of there being at least one altruist among the others is 1 – 
en-1. It is rational for her to abstain from acquiring the public good if 
b – C ≤ (1 – en–1)b     (1) 
For n = 2 this is true if4  
e
b
C ≥        (2) 
In this case, the likelihood [π(n, e)], that the public good will be produced 
equals to the likelihood of there being at least one altruist in the group. 
                                                   
3 See (Goeree et al 2002) on the relationship between alturism and group size. 
4 And if it holds for n = 2, than it also holds for any group larger than that. 
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π(n, e) = 1 – en.      (3) 
According to this, the likelihood of actually producing the public good 
proportional to the size of the group and inversely proportional to the ratio of egoists 
in the population. The former relationship seems to contradict the results of Olson 
whose opinion is, that small groups are more successful in providing public goods 
than bigger ones (Olson 1997), but notice, that in this model the utilities b derived 
from using the good by the members of the group is independent of the size of the 
group (as I assumed there be no congestion), whereas in Olson’s model the sum of 
the member’s utilities Σbi(n) is constant. 
What happens, if the original population is more egoistic, or the cost-benefit 
ratio more favourable? With suitably chosen parameter values the ratio of eg ists in 
the population will exceed C/b, that is 
e
b
C < .       (4) 
In this case b – C > (1 – en–1), and since e < 1 and C > 0, there exist a critical 
group size n* so, that 
b – C > (1 – en–1)b  for every n < n* and 
b – C ≤ (1 – en–1)b  for every n ≥ n*. 







n      (5) 
Critical group size is thus bigger the less favourable the cost-utility ratio is, 
and the smaller the ratio of egoists in the basis-population. There are two 
possibilities: 
1. if n ≥ n*, then the existence of at least one altruist in the group is very likely, 
so the dominant strategy for the egoists is not to pay, that is, to free ride.  
The probability of the production of the public good is the same (1 – en) as in 
the previous case. 
2. if n < n*, then one egoist is going to pay, the others are not. Symmetric 
behaviour is not a possible equilibrium, since we assumed b > C, so payment 
of one single person is enough for the public good to be produced. It is also 
not a possible equilibrium that no one pays, since b – C > (1 – en–1)b. Let us 
denote with p the probability that a given (egoistic) person will not pay!  
Who does pay will earn a net utility of b – C. Who does not pay will earn net 
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b utility if someone else does pay, and 0 otherwise. The likelihood that one 
member of the n – 1 size group („the others”) will pay is 1 – (ep)n–1, which is 
the sum of the likelihood of „there is at least one altruist” (1 – en–1) and 
„although there are no altruists, at least one of the egoists will eventually pay” 
[en–1(1 – pn–1)]. 
 
If b – C > [1 – (ep)n–1]b than the probability of one egoist paying will 
increase, otherwise it will decrease. In equilibrium 
b – C = [1 – (ep)n–1]b, 













ep for every n < n*.    (6) 
The decrease (increase) of altruists is, in this case (when n < n* and e > C/b) 
offset by the increase (decrease) in the egoists’ willingness to pay, thus the right 
hand side of the equation is constant.5 The likelihood of the public good actually 
being produced will be then independent of the level of altruism:  
π(e, n) = 1 – (ep)n,     (7) 














.       (8) 
The probability of the public good actually being produced is inversely 
proportional to the size of the group.6 
In the former 1) case the smaller the ratio of egoists in the population and the 
larger the size of the group, the more likely it is, that the public good will be 
produced. The precondition of a certain production of the public good is the total 
absence of egoists or an infinitely large group. These results signify what an 
entrepreneur should do: she should lower the ratio of egoists within the group or 
raise the size of the group concerned. In my opinion, the “magnitude” of egoism is 
directly proportional to C/b whereas the “feeling” of belonging to the concerned 
group is inversely proportional to it. Lowering the costs of providing the public 
good, which is a typical task for an entrepreneur, will lower the probability of 
                                                   
5 As a reminder, e is the ratio of egoists within the population, p is the egoists’ likelihood of not paying. 
A rise in the ratio of egoists means an increase in e a d their higher propensity to pay means a decrease 
in p. 
6 Assuming C/b = 0,5 the probability of the public good actually being produced is π(e, n) = 0,75 when 
n = 2 and π(e, n) → 0,5 when n → ∞.  
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egoistic behaviour, and higher private advantages associated with the existence of 
the public good (b) can raise the size of the group. The private advantages associated 
with the existence of the public good can be supplemented with various “selective 
incentives” Olson mentions (Olson 1997). These selectiv  incentives are non 
collective goods, the individual usage of which is conditional on taking part in 
financing a public good, and thus can be an effectiv  ool in organising latent 
groups. In my opinion such private goods that can be used by members of a group 
can, in addition to their functions mentioned by Olson, induce people to be part of 
the group, which in turn make them interested in providing the public good that 
enhances welfare of the group. I do not therefore tak  the relevant group as given, 
this is why we can speak here of the “feeling of belonging to a group”. It is one of 
the tasks of the entrepreneur to generate and strengthen this kind of feeling in 
prospective consumers through informing them, providing complementary goods or 
in other ways. 
In case 2) the more probable the actual production of the public good the 
smaller the C/b ratio, and the smaller the concerned group. In this case the perquisite 
for the certain production is C = 0.7 
In the above model we cannot reach the reassuring co clusion that under 
realistic circumstances voluntary contributions canassure the provision of the public 
good whenever the sum of private valuations is higher t an the cost of providing the 
good. This (ex post) efficiency condition is maybe a too strict one too according to 
Menezes et al. (Menezes et al 2001). It is in fact not very appropriate to evaluate the 
“goodness” of an allocation mechanism on a binary (either good or bad) scale.  
An alternative evaluative method can be, as the aforementioned authors also suggest 
is to measure the probability of actually providing the public good, once provision is 
otherwise effective8. 
4. No potential consumer 
The situation gets even more difficult, if no member of the group has a high enough 
willingness to pay as to finance the public good, even though its existence would be 
Pareto-efficient, that is 
bi < C,  for every i, and:  n⋅b > C. 
The contribution of any single player is insufficient in this situation to 
guarantee for her the availability of the public good. Her contribution is than useless 
                                                   
7 Lower costs will modify the reaction of the players under some circumstances. It can happen, that it 
lowers willingness to pay, and thus it will not change the likelihood of the public good’s production 
(Menezes et al 2001). 
8 It would be good to use this kind of evaluation in general, whenever the efficiency of allocative 
systems, market structures are considered. 
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if not enough other players other than her contribue and meaningless if the public 
good is financed without her contribution anyway. The real question here is the 
probability of hers being the pivotal contribution. How probable is it, that the public 
good will not be produced without her contribution, but it will with it? Let us 
investigate first the case when n = 2, bi = 1 (i = 1,2) and 1 < C < 2. Denoting ci the 
contribution of the i-th person to the costs, the public good can be financed if  
Σci ≥ C. 
If the players have perfect information regarding the valuation of the others, 
than any contribution so that C–1 < ci < b1 = 1 can lead to the efficient outcome, to 
the procurement of the public good. The symmetric outc me is naturally the  
c1 = c2 = C/2. 
Considering now the case of less than perfect information, let us assume, that 
any player values the public good at bi = 1 with a probability of 0,5 and bi = 0 with 
the same probability. While everyone is perfectly aware of her own valuation, as to 
the others everyone knows only this probability distribution. Depending on what 
happens with the contributions paid if the public good is not produced due to the 
behaviour of the other, two cases can be distinguished (Menezes et al 2001). 
a) In the first „game” if Σci ≥ C the public good will be purchased, but the 
potentially positive sum Σci – C will not be refunded (but will remain the 
profit of the producer). In the case of Σci < C, however, the contributions are 
paid back. This variation is called subscription game. The symmetric Nash-
equilibrium in this game is, that everyone contributes ci = 0 if the good is 
invaluable, and ci = C/2 whenever the good is valued at 1.
9 The outcome will 
always be Pareto-optimal. 
b) In the other game, Σci < C is a sufficient condition to prevent the purchase of 
the good, but the money paid in already will not be refunded. This kind is 
called contribution game10. The contribution of player 1. is obviously zero if 
b1 = 0. How much is she willing to pay, if she values the good at 1? In case of 
a contribution of C/2 the public good will be purchased with a probability of 
50%, which means an expected value of ½, thus the exp cted net utility is  
½ – C/2 < 0. Maximal contribution from each player is ½,which is not 
sufficient to finance the public good, as we assumed C > 1. The resulting 
outcome will not be efficient11. 
 
This simple, two-player model with binary valuations can be generalised to  
N > 2 players or to cases in which the valuation of the players is characterised by 
continuous probabilistic variables of known distribut on (Menezes et al 2001).  
                                                   
9 Nash (or Nash-Cournot) equilibrium means, that everyone’s choice is optimal, given everyone else’s 
choice. This means, that no one wants to alter her strategy ex post. 
10 Typical examples of this are when the contribution is an unconditional donation or physical work. 
11 Further models that assume non constant contributions in (Menezes et al 2001). 
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More complicated models bring up many new issues and make lots of new insights, 
but in our case they all mark pretty much the same path as our above compact 
model. More general analysis also supports the superiority of the subscription game 
over the contribution game just as it is confirmed in laboratory experiments. Perhaps 
our opinion is not fictitious, that in contribution game situations secondary 
(„selective”, if you like) incentives like self-esteem or prestige play a greater role 
than potential benefits from the public good itself. This is suggested by the 
significant national differences in donation habits. In subscription games, however, 
the contrary can be assumed. 
Let us now assume, that from a group of n at least 1 ≤ w ≤ n members have to 
contribute to the production of the public good. For the sake of simplicity let us 
again fix the amount of contribution at c per person. Denoting with mn the number of 
contributors in the group of n, the probability that there is exactly mn–1 = w – 1 
contributors in any group of n – 1 (the „others”), that is, the player in question s a 
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where e denotes again the ratio of egoists within the population, and p the 
probability that an egoist will not pay. The indifference condition for a given group-
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Subtracting the right hand probability from both sides and rearranging we get: 
cbwmprob
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The probability also, that in a group of n only m < w members contribute, and 
therefore the public good will not be produced is the sum of probabilities m = s,  
s < w  





















ne .    (13) 
The probability of the public good being produced is than obviously: 

























nene .  (14) 
Because of (6), ep is constant, the altruist/egoist ratio again does not affect the 
probability of producing the public good. This probability will decrease as the group 
size increases until n* (Hindriks–Pancs 2001), above that this probability ncreases. 
Increase in the number of necessary contributors also decreases the probability of 
the production of the public good. 
5. Conclusion 
The task of the par excellence entrepreneur is to discover opportunities by which she 
is able to enhance net social welfare, and collect reward for her doing so from those 
who enjoy this enhanced welfare. Every situation comm nly discussed under the 
topic of „market failure” is thus an opportunity to market players. An environment 
should be created, where the entrepreneur can reachher goal, and at the same time 
also fullfills her social function („invisible hand”). 
In this paper we investigated a public good, which is an eclatant example of 
market failure, and three possible relevant groups. We assumed a public good in the 
consumption of which – in our terminology: naturally – there is no rivalry, no 
congestion effect, and excluding non-payers would be socially inefficient due to 
exclusion costs. We analised a (relevant) group, in which at least one member’s 
willingness to pay exceeds the production cost of the public good, then one in which 
this holds for more members and lastly one in which the provision of the public 
good is conditional on common financing. 
In the more complicated cases (2. and 3.) we pointed out those factors  
– cost/benefit ratio, group size, selective incentives – which an entrepreneur could 
modulate, thus making the opportunity to enhance welfare also an opportunity to 
earn money. We also pointed out, that in the analised situations the not so market-
conform altruistic behaviour do not necessarily enhance the efficiency of the 
allocation. 
Of course most of the public goods that are generally viewed as such can have 
many other specific characteristics (congestion, excludability of non-payers) that 
bring up newer problems and call for new solutions. The objective of this paper was 
solely to show, that these (private) opportunities can in fact exist.  
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